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COMMUNICATIVE BOTTLENECKS LEAD TO MAXIMAL
INFORMATION TRANSFER
TRAVIS LACROIX
Abstract. This paper presents new analytic and numerical analysis of sig-
nalling games that give rise to informational bottlenecks—that is to say, sig-
nalling games with more state/act pairs than available signals to communicate
information about the world. I show via simulation that agents learning to
coordinate tend to favour partitions of nature which provide maximal informa-
tion transfer. This is true despite the fact that nothing from an initial analysis
of the stability properties of the underlying signalling game suggests that this
should be the case. As a first pass to explain this, I note that the underlying
structure of our model favours maximal information transfer in regard to the
simple combinatorial properties of how the agents might partition nature into
kinds. However, I suggest that this does not perfectly capture the empirical
results; thus, several open questions remain.
Keywords — signalling games, signals, signalling systems, information trans-
fer, informational bottlenecks, reinforcement learning; emergent communica-
tion; sender-receiver games
1. Introduction
Descriptive language concerning natural kinds has been taken to evolve as a
response to successful projections to more well-entrenched ‘kind predicates’ (Good-
man, 1965). Furthermore, the degree to which such descriptive language (regarding
terms that are supposed to be or represent kinds) is entrenched might have some
bearing on ‘general’, as opposed to ‘artificial’, kinds. With this sort of analysis in
mind, Barrett (2007) considers how a successful descriptive ‘kind language’ might
evolve in the context of a simple sender-receiver game, called a signalling game.
The signalling game, due to Lewis (1969), shows how successful communication
conventions might arise naturally by a process of repeated interactions. Evolution-
ary signalling games constitute a now-standard model for explaining and studying
the emergence of communication in a wide range of social organisms—from humans
and primates to bees and bacteria. This finds theoretical application in linguistics,
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evolutionary biology, and philosophy in research on language origins, in addition
to practical application in computer science—especially machine learning and AI—
in emergent communication. The basic signalling model has been extended in a
number of ways to shed light on a variety of phenomena that are of philosophical
interest, including meta-linguistic notions of truth and probability (Barrett, 2016,
2017), self-assembly and modular composition (Barrett and Skyrms, 2017; Barrett
et al., 2018; LaCroix, 2019c), prevarication (Skyrms and Barrett, 2018), etc.
Skyrms (2010a) highlights a variety of ways in which the simple signalling-game
framework might be extended. This may include varying the underlying dynamics,
varying the parameters of the model, or imposing some sort of network structure on
the game, among others.1 While there exist analytic results in some instances, many
such extensions are still being studied—often with the use of computer simulations.
I will be concerned here with a simple, but under-studied, extension of the sig-
nalling game where there are fewer signals than state/act pairs. This leads to
an informational bottleneck, as the agents cannot learn a bijective mapping from
states to signals and from signals to actions. That is to say, the agents in this sort
of signalling game lack the expressive power to communicate full information about
every possible state of the world that may obtain.
Of course, the players may learn rules for syntactic combination to perfectly par-
tition nature. This is the situation discussed in Barrett (2006, 2007, 2009): signals
are sent by multiple senders, which allows the receiver to obtain full information
about the exact state of the world. In this case, the players must simultaneously
invent the categories—i.e., partitions nature into distinct kinds—and code for rep-
resenting the categories thus invented. Syntax, therefore, helps create ‘new’ signals
from old ones to fully and naturally partition the world and represent those par-
titions via language. This is a step toward the sort of compositional richness that
would be required for a fully linguistic communication system.2
The present paper offers several new analytic and experimental results regarding
signalling situations where there are informational bottlenecks—i.e., fewer signals
than state/act pairs. Rather than modifying the game by adding players, as Barrett
(2006, 2007, 2009) does, I examine the types of partitions that in fact arise under nu-
merical simulation.3 Specifically, I demonstrate how prior analyses of evolutionary
stability do not give a complete picture of the expected outcome of the dynamic in
1See LaCroix (2019b) for further discussion.
2Though this simple syntactic game is not itself compositional, see the discussion in Franke (2016);
Steinert-Threlkeld (2016); LaCroix (2019a).
3In a related paper, Barrett and LaCroix (2020) use these results to explain how the structural
properties of a language come to reflect the world in which the language evolved. This shows
how something like a principle of indifference (in a Bayesian sense) might arise naturally in an
evolutionary context. This is discussed in further detail, in relation to the current analysis, in
Section 5.
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question—in this case, simple reinforcement learning. Perhaps surprisingly, there is
a natural movement toward optimal information transfer. Thus, I examine why we
should expect communication to naturally favour maximal information transfer in
addition to rates of successful communication, even though extant analytic results
(and indeed, the learning dynamic itself) only takes account of the latter.
Section 2 provides some background on the signalling-game framework. I offer
several formal definitions that will be of some use later in the paper. Section 3 looks
more closely at the signalling context that I will focus on here and surveys some
extant analytic results, primarily due to Donaldson et al. (2007), to which I will
appeal. Section 4 offers new analytic results, in addition to simulation results, to
demonstrate the connection between communicative success and information trans-
fer in a signalling-game context with fewer signals than state/act pairs. Section 5
concludes.
2. Signalling Games
The Lewis signalling game has two players, whom we call the ‘sender’ and the
‘receiver’. In the simplest signalling game, there are two possible states of the
world, denoted by ‘s0’ and ‘s1’; two possible signals or messages that the sender
might select, denoted by ‘m0’ and ‘m1’; and two possible actions that the receiver
might perform, denoted by ‘a0’ and ‘a1’. We refer to this as a 2×2 signalling game,
corresponding to the number of state/act pairs by the number of signals. Here,
each action coincides with a particular state of the world—we assume that ai is the
correct action in state sj just in case i = j.
On each play of the game, nature picks a state of the world at random.4 The
sender observes the state of the world directly and randomly selects a message to
send to the receiver. The receiver knows which message was sent, but does not
know which state of the world obtains. She then chooses an action at random.
If the receiver’s action was appropriate for the state, then the play is successful;
otherwise, it is a failure.
The players have evolved or learned an efficient language when they perform
better than chance on coordinating signals to state/act pairs. A maximally efficient
signalling convention is referred to as a signalling system (Lewis, 1969). In this case,
there is a map from unique states to unique signals to appropriate actions. The
2 × 2 signalling game has two possible signalling systems, shown in Figure 1. In
either case, at a signalling system for the 2 × 2 signalling game, the sender and
receiver have a communicative success rate of 1, and each signal carries exactly 1
bit of information.
4For now, I will assume that all states are equiprobable, so nature is unbiased, but this assumption
can be relaxed.
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(b) Signalling System 2
Figure 1. The two signalling systems of the 2× 2 signalling game
How the sender and receiver achieve such a communication convention is going
to depend largely upon the dynamic under consideration.5 I will use a simple
learning dynamic, called Herrnstein reinforcement learning. On this dynamic, the
probability of an actor’s choosing a particular action is proportional to that action’s
accumulated rewards.6 When the players succeed, they earn some payoff and thus
reinforce their behaviour. When they fail, they may receive nothing, or they may
receive some negative payoff (punishment).
We can understand this intuitively as a type of urn-learning procedure. For
the 2 × 2 signalling game, we now suppose that the sender comes equipped with
two urns—one labelled ‘s0’, and the other labelled ‘s1’. Each of the sender’s urns
contains two balls—labelled ‘m0’ and ‘m1’, respectively. Similarly, the receiver
comes equipped with two urns—one labelled ‘m0’, and the other labelled ‘m1’—
and each of her urns contains two balls—labelled ‘a0’ and ‘a1’, respectively. See
Figure 2.
s0
m0 m1
s1
m0 m1
(a) Sender Urns
m0
a0 a1
m1
a0 a1
(b) Receiver Urns
Figure 2. Simple reinforcement learning model
Now, on each play of the game, nature picks a state of the world at random. The
sender then chooses a ball at random from the urn corresponding to the current
state of the world and sends the message chosen to the receiver. The receiver chooses
a ball at random from the urn corresponding to the message that she received. If
the action chosen matches the state of the world, then both the sender and receiver
5See Huttegger et al. (2010) for an overview of a number of different dynamics.
6This simple reinforcement learning is based upon the ‘matching law’ proposed by Herrnstein
(1970), which is itself a formalisation of the ‘law of effect’, due to Thorndike (1905, 1911, 1927).
This learning rule is empirically tested in Roth and Erev (1995); Erev and Roth (1998). On the
real-world effectiveness of simple learning, Schultz et al. (1997) show that dopamine neurons in
certain areas of primate brains seem to enact a reasonably similar learning procedure. See also
Schultz (2004) and Glimcher (2011).
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return their ball to the urn from which it was chosen and additionally reinforce
their behaviour by adding another ball of the same type to that urn, thus shifting
the probabilities of choosing a particular signal or action over future plays. If the
action does not match the state of the world, then the sender and receiver both
simply return the ball to its urn.7 The game is then repeated.
This reinforcement procedure makes it more likely that a message [act] that led
to a success will be chosen when a particular state [message] occurs. Thus, signals
come to carry information (Skyrms, 2010a,b). Though this model is relatively
simple, it turns out to be extremely effective for learning how to communicate.8
The information that a signal carries might be understood as information about
the state.9 When signals are completely informative, the receiver has complete
information about the state of the world, and so can act as though she had observed
the state directly. Skyrms (2010a,b) shows how we can specify the quantity of
information in a given signal using Kullback-Leibler divergence. This compares the
(conditional) probability that the agents are in a particular state given that a signal
was sent, and the probability that the agents are in that state simpliciter.10
We can define the quantity of information carried by a particular signal, mj (i.e.,
about a specific state, si) as
H(mj) = log
p(si|mj)
p(si)
.
This quantity at a signalling system results in mj carrying 1 bit of information in
the 2× 2 game.11
Skyrms (2010a,b) points out that signals may carry some information about
different states. Thus, to get a real sense of the amount of information that a
particular signal carries, we can take a weighted sum of the probabilities of being
in any of the particular states conditional upon the particular signal. Therefore,
we obtain the following measure of the quantity of information that is carried by a
7Punishment for miscoordination can be included in this model. This simply consists of discarding
the ball when the agents fail to coordinate.
8In the 2 × 2 signalling game, when nature is not too biased, the sender and receiver converge
toward one or the other signalling system with probability 1 under this sort of dynamic (Argiento
et al., 2009). Therefore, in the limit, the players learn to coordinate perfectly. Furthermore, after
only 300 time-steps, the communicative success rate of the sender and receiver is approximately
0.9, on average (Skyrms, 2010a). Similar results hold for a variety of other dynamics, such as the
replicator dynamic. See Huttegger (2007a,c) for an overview.
9The signal may also be understood as being about actions; see Huttegger (2007b); Zollman (2011)
on separating indicatives and imperatives.
10See Godfrey-Smith (2011); Birch (2014); Shea et al. (2018) for a critical discussion of Skyrms’
notion of informational content in the signalling game.
11That is to say, there is a reduction of uncertainty from two possibilities to one. At a signalling
system in a 4× 4 game, signals carry two bits of information (and so on). One bit of information,
in this example, corresponds to the logarithm’s base being 2. The units of this quantity can be
specified similarly as nats or harts if we change the base to e or 10, respectively.
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particular signal, mj :
I(mj) =
|S|∑
i=1
p(si|mj) · log
(
p(si|mj)
p(si)
)
.
Note that this definition requires a slightly different interpretation than the original
notion of Shannon entropy since we are examining the quantity of information given
by a single message.12 This is a notion of semantic information (Dretske, 1981).13
We might also note the total entropy of a signalling strategy. This is just the
sum of the information contained in all the individual messages, weighted by the
probability that a message occurs. In the case of a signalling system in a symmetric
n × n signalling game, the probability that a message occurs will just equal the
probability that a given state (the one represented by that message) will occur.
For our purposes, it will be convenient to have a formal definition of a signalling
game, thus.14
Definition 2.1: Signalling Game
Let ∆(X) be a set of probability distributions over a finite set X. A Sig-
nalling Game is a tuple
Σ = 〈S,M,A, σ, ρ, u, P 〉
where S = {s1, . . . , sk} is a set of states, M = {m1, . . . ,ml} is a set of
messages, A = {a1, . . . , an} is a set of acts, with S,M , and A nonempty.
σ : S → ∆(M), is a function which defines a sender, ρ : M → ∆(A) defines
a receiver, u : S × A → R defines a utility function, and P ∈ ∆(S) gives a
probability distribution over states in S. Finally, σ and ρ have a common
payoff, given by
pi(σ, ρ) =
∑
s∈S
P (s)
∑
a∈A
u(s, a) ·
(∑
m∈M
σ(s)(m) · ρ(m)(a)
)
The payoff pi(σ, ρ) for a particular combination of sender and receiver strategies
is an expectation of the utilities of state/act pairs (given by u(s, a)) weighted by the
relative probability of a particular state, given by P (S). This is the communicative
success rate of σ and ρ.15 With this definition in mind, the signalling systems of a
signalling game can be defined formally as follows.
12See, Shannon (1948) and Shannon and Weaver (1949).
13In this context, the relative entropy of a particular signal can be understood as a measure
of the information with respect to additional bits gained by moving from a prior to a posterior
distribution, in a Bayesian sense.
14See Huttegger (2007a) and Steinert-Threlkeld (2016).
15This definition of a signalling game is more general than, e.g., that of Lewis (1969).
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Definition 2.2: Signalling Systems
A signalling system in a signalling game is a pair (σ, ρ) of a sender and
receiver that maximises pi(ρ, σ).
I will be interested here in more narrow contexts of coordination problems. In
particular, I will focus on signalling contexts where there are fewer messages than
state/act pairs, where nature is unbiased, and where the utility function pays 1 just
in case the state and the act match and zero otherwise. Thus, the n×m signalling
game with unbiased nature is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3: n×m Signalling Game With Unbiased Nature
The n × m Signalling Game is the signalling game with |S| = |A| = n,
|M | = m, u(si, aj) = δij , and P (s) = 1/n for every s ∈ S. Further, δij is
the Kronecker delta, defined as
δij =
{
1 if i = j
0 else
.
Note, that the symmetric n×n signalling game is just a special case of the n×m
signalling game with |S| = |M | = |A| = n. If n < m we have a situation wherein
synonyms might arise (Skyrms, 2010a; Hu et al., 2011). If n > m, we get a situation
where the sender and receiver cannot communicate perfectly. This gives rise to an
informational bottleneck. I will be concerned here with solely the situation that is
described in Definition 2.3, with n > m. For ease of exposition, I will call this an
impoverished signalling game, since the communicative resources of the sender are
impoverished with respect to the complexity of the world.
Donaldson et al. (2007) offer an analytic analysis of this sort of situation; how-
ever, they use a more general utility function, u(si, aj), than the Kronecker delta, so
that there may be, for example, a general-purpose action that is more appropriate
than a specific-purpose action when the state of the world is uncertain. Advancing
the earlier work of Wa¨rneryd (1993) and Trapa and Nowak (2000), they show that
it is possible to define an evolutionarily stable set of strategies in such a context.
This is particularly important for situations modelling animal communication since
“real predator alarm call systems tend to employ only a few signals to distinguish
between predators, with many types lumped together” (Donaldson et al., 2007,
231). In such a case, it is advantageous for individuals to represent a pool of states
by a single signal when those states are functionally similar. Based on the analysis
of Donaldson et al. (2007), I present some useful properties of the impoverished
signalling game in Section 3.
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3. State Partitions and Informational Bottlenecks
This section summarises and analyses some previous results for informational
bottlenecks that are pertinent to the discussion herein. In an evolutionary con-
text, we are effectively concerned with a two-population model, and thus a role-
asymmetric game. As such, a sender strategy in an evolutionarily stable state (ESS)
must be uniquely optimal against the receiver strategy, and the receiver strategy
must, similarly, be uniquely optimal against the sender strategy (Selten, 1980).
Donaldson et al. (2007) show that the following four conditions are necessary for
a signalling system to be a strict Nash equilibrium, and therefore an evolutionarily
stable strategy.
Property 3.1: The signalling strategy, σ, must be binary; that is, each
state gives rise to exactly one signal.16
Property 3.2: The receiving strategy, ρ, must be binary; that is, each
signal results in exactly one action.17
Property 3.3: The signalling strategy, σ, must be onto; that is, every
signal must be used.18
Property 3.4: The receiving strategy, ρ, must be one-to-one; that is, no
two signals may give rise to the same action.19
Donaldson et al. (2007) note that these four properties limit the type of multi-
plicity that is allowable in a signalling game. One state leading to multiple signals,
and one signal leading to multiple actions are both ruled out by a theorem of Sel-
ten (1980), from which Properties 3.1 and 3.2 follow. Namely, an evolutionarily
stable strategy can only have one possible response for a particular circumstance.
Property 3.4 rules out the possibility that multiple signals lead to the same action.
However, the possibility of multiple states leading to the same signal is not ruled
out. Donaldson et al. (2007) point out that if this is the case, then the signal comes
to ‘mean’ that one of several possible situations has occurred. (They further point
out that if payoffs are asymmetric, it is still possible to determine the unique action
with maximal payoff.) Though Properties 3.1–3.4 are individually necessary for
evolutionary stability, they are not jointly sufficient.
16See Donaldson et al. (2007). This follows from a proof due to Selten (1980).
17See Donaldson et al. (2007). This follows from a proof due to Selten (1980).
18Proof is given by Donaldson et al. (2007).
19Proof is given by Donaldson et al. (2007).
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I further introduce the following definitions, assuming Properties 3.1–3.4 hold,
to obtain a formal description of a state partition, where there are fewer signals
than state/act pairs, and the best response to such a partition.
Definition 3.1: State Partition
The partition of states τ(m) associated with a signal m is the set of states
mapping to that signal under σ: τ(m) = {s : p(m|s) = 1}.20
Definition 3.2: Best Response to a State Partition
A best response to a partition of states is an action which maximises the
expected payoff for all members of the partition:
BR(τ) = arg max
a∈A
∑
s∈τ
p(s)u(s, a).
If there is a unique such action, it is termed the strict best response to the
partition.
Given these definitions, two further properties hold:
Property 3.5: Every partition must have a strict best response, and the
signal corresponding to that partition must map to it.21
Property 3.6: For each member of a partition of states, the strict best
response for that partition must be a better response than the strict best
response of any other partition. That is, for all s ∈ τ(mi),mj 6= mi:22
pi(σ,BR(τ(mi))) > pi(σ,BR(τ(mj))).
Thus, Donaldson et al. (2007) prove the following general theorem for evolution-
ary stability:
Theorem 3.1: A strategy that is determined by σ, ρ is evolutionarily sta-
ble if and only if the properties 3.1–3.6 listed above hold.23
In the case where there are fewer signals than state/act pairs, as in the impov-
erished signalling game, multiple states necessarily map to a single signal. While
this situation is consistent with the above properties, when payoffs are symmet-
ric it is impossible for this situation to be evolutionarily stable since there cannot
20Donaldson et al. (2007) refer to this as a ‘pool’, in order to draw a connection to pooling
equilibria. I will refer to τ as a partition. Thus, ‘pool’ and ‘partition’ refer to the same thing.
21Proof is given by Donaldson et al. (2007).
22Proof is given by Donaldson et al. (2007).
23Proof is given by Donaldson et al. (2007).
10 TRAVIS LACROIX
be a unique (strict) best response to that partition—i.e., Property 3.6 is violated.
However, an evolutionarily stable set—namely, a partition that groups together a
set of acts and has a well-defined probability distribution over the acts—satisfies
Properties 3.1–3.6 and thus is evolutionarily stable. Figure 3 shows a particular
example where τ(m0) = {s0, s1} and τ(m1) = {s2}. No single evolutionarily stable
a0 a1 a2
s0 1 0 0
s1 0 1 0
s2 0 0 1
(a) Payoff table
s0
s1
s2
m0
m1
a0
a1
a2
x
1− x
(b) Evolutionarily stable set
Figure 3. Example of an evolutionarily stable set of strategies
strategy exists for this system. However, the set of strategies given by
{(σ, ρ(x)) : x ∈ [0, 1]}
is itself evolutionarily stable, since it constitutes an evolutionarily stable set.
4. Communicative Success and Information Transfer
In this section, I present novel analytic results for the impoverished signalling
game. However, the analytic results (Section 4.1) highlight that all stable partitions
have an equivalent expected payoff. As such, we might suppose that each of these
possibilities is equally likely. When we move to the simulation results of Section 4.2,
however, we see that this is not the case. Thus, the main findings of this paper
highlight that the analytic treatment, e.g., of Donaldson et al. (2007) is insufficient
for an explanation of what is happening on these models. In particular, the players
tend to favour partitions that offer maximal information transfer. Previous analytic
results do not explain this phenomenon. I discuss a possible combinatorial expla-
nation of what is driving this result; however, I show that this too is not sufficient
to explain these outcomes.
4.1. Analytic Results. The first proposition that we will require is given as fol-
lows.
Proposition 4.1: The maximal communicative success rate for the im-
poverished signalling game, as defined in Definition 2.3, is
maxpi(σ, ρ) =
|M |
|S| ,
where |M | is the cardinality of the set of messages, and |S| is the cardinality
of the set of states.
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Proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Note that for the symmetric n × n signalling game, this reduces to a maximum
expected payoff of 1 (|M | = |S|), as would be expected. Two corollaries follow
immediately from this.
Corollary 4.1: In a signalling game, as defined in Definition 2.3, a strategy
wherein the sender does not take advantage of all of the signals available
to her has a lower communicative success rate than a strategy which does
take advantage of all the signals available to her.
Proof. See Appendix A for details. 
Given this fact, it should not matter how many states are in any partition as
long as there are the same number of partitions as there are signals. (This also
implies that every partition contains at least one state.) Further:
Corollary 4.2: All probability distributions of strategies that take advan-
tage of all available messages have equivalent (maximal) communicative
success.
Proof. Since I assumed nothing about the actual probabil-
ity distributions in the proof of Proposition 4.1, this follows
immediately. 
Thus, it does not matter what the receiver’s probabilities are as long as she
partitions the acts in the same way that the sender partitions the states.
What I have just shown is that, under the assumption that nature is unbiased
(all states are equiprobable), and the utility function is given by u(i, j) = δi,j—the
Kronecker delta—as long as the sender takes advantage of all possible signals at her
disposal, the sender and receiver both receive maximal payoff, maxpi(σ, ρ) = |M ||S| ,
independently of how the states are partitioned and independently of the receiver’s
probability distribution over acts given signals.
This gives rise to the following question: which partitions and which receiver
strategies (in response to those partitions) might we expect to arise for this type
of signalling game? The analytic results offer no indication of an answer to this
question—as long as a partition is stable, it will constitute a signalling system.
Recall that τ(mi) = {si,0, si,1, . . . , si,j} denotes a set of states that map to a
message, mi; the cardinality of τ(mi) tells us how many states are ‘contained’ in
that partition. Thus, let us introduce the following notation for denoting a full
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partition of nature:
τ(M) = 〈|τ(m0)|, |τ(m1)|, . . . , |τ(mi)|〉.
For example, the unbiased partition for the 4 × 2 signalling game is denoted by
〈2, 2〉, which can be read in the following way: the first partition, corresponding to
m0, contains 2 states, and the second partition, corresponding to m1, contains 2
states.
Note that there is only one way at arriving at the unbiased partition, 〈2, 2〉, but
there are two ways of arriving at each of the biased partitions, 〈3, 1〉 versus 〈1, 3〉
and 〈4, 0〉 versus 〈0, 4〉. Since the latter pair do not take advantage of all of the
signals available, they are unstable, and we can assume that they will not occur.
As such, we might expect each of the remaining partitions to occur with frequency
1/3, since they all have the same communicative success rate (under the assumption
that the receiver is best responding to the partition).
However, this does not account for the fact that each ‘distinct’ partition, in
the above sense, has a variety of ways that it might be arrived at, and these are
not equinumerous across partitions. Accounting for the combinatorial properties of
these partitions, in the case of the 4 × 2 game, we have (42) = 6 ways of arriving
at the unbiased partition and
(
4
1
)
=
(
4
3
)
= 4 ways of arriving at each of the biased
partitions. Therefore, there are 14 possible combinations to consider, and their
relative frequencies are 3/7, 2/7 and 2/7, respectively.24
In this case, we should expect a distribution that looks like a binomial coefficient.
This course-grained analysis accounts for which types of partitions occur. However,
if we examine a more fine-grained analysis, we will expect a uniform distribution
across the various ways of getting at each partition—i.e., taking account of which
states are in a given partition.
So, on the course-grained analysis, simulations should result in a distribution
of partitions that approximates a binomial coefficient. Surprisingly, this is not
the case. What we find is that the partitions tend to be biased toward maximal
information transfer—more weight is put on those partitions close to the unbiased
partition. I present the data from these simulation results below and discuss why
the combinatorial measure alone cannot be used to explain the partitions that
evolve under simple reinforcement.
4.2. Simulation Results. In this section, I present simulation results which show
that neither an analysis of the stability properties of the impoverished signalling
24Again, I do not include in our frequency expectation the possible outcome for
(4
0
)
=
(4
4
)
= 1.
This would have us calculate our expected frequencies out of 16 possibilities rather than 14;
however, these outcomes correspond to unstable strategies, and so they will be selected against in
the long-term.
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game nor the combinatorial argument given above can serve to explain the observed
distribution of partitions under simple reinforcement learning.
4.2.1. Unbiased Nature. We will start with a 10× 2 signalling game with unbiased
nature. Thus, there are 10 states, each equiprobable, and 10 correspondent actions,
but only 2 signals with which the sender may represent these states.25 The chance
payoff for this game is 1/10 = 0.1, and the maximal payoff—occurring at any
possible stable partition and correspondent receiver strategy, as per the analytic
results above—is 1/5 = 0.2.
On simulation, after 106 plays per run, the expected payoff is 0.1999, on average
(1000 runs). Every run (1.000) achieves an expected payoff greater than 0.1990.
Furthermore, learning is fast. This is demonstrated by the fact that the cumulative
success rate is 0.1995 after 106 plays per run, on average (1000 runs).26 Many runs
(0.875) achieve a cumulative success rate of at least 0.1990.
As was suggested above by the reasoning that appealed to the combinatorial
measure, the unbiased 〈5, 5〉 partition is indeed the most common of the 9 stable
partitions for this game: almost 1/3 of the time (0.310), the sender and receiver per-
fectly partition nature for maximal information transfer. Most of the time (0.792),
the sender and receiver partition nature near-perfectly—that is, a 〈5, 5〉, 〈6, 4〉,
or 〈4, 6〉 partition. Rarely (0.031), the sender and receiver fail to evolve a clear
partition of nature.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of runs for the impoverished signalling game with
10 state/act pairs and 2 signals under simple reinforcement. The entropy (mean
information per signal) is represented in this figure to illustrate how the bias of the
partitions correspond to information transfer—namely, the less biased the partition,
the more informative it is. Note that the combinatorial measure does not perfectly
track the actual distribution of partitions on simulation. One might attribute this
to mere noise; however, the likelihood of more biased partitions drops off even
faster than the number of ways to obtain these partitions. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test of the distribution on simulation against a distribution sampled from the
combinatorial expectation yields a p-value of 0.0017 on the null hypothesis that the
expected distribution and the observed distribution are identical. This suggests that
the combinatorial expectation does not, by itself, explain the empirical results.27
25In our urn-learning metaphor, the sender has ten urns, each starting with two balls, and the
receiver has two urns each starting with 10 balls.
26The cumulative success rate is a measure of success that takes account of the history of the
game. It is calculated by dividing the number of plays that led to a success by the total number
of plays in that run. When the players are successful, early failures are washed out as the number
of plays increases.
27The KS test on these data gives the statistic D = 0.0843, which is the supremum of the set of
distances between the empirical distribution function we observe and the expected distribution
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Figure 4. Partitioning 10 unbiased states with 2 signals. Com-
parison of experimental results with combinatorial expectation and
average information transfer
We see the same phenomena in the impoverished signalling game with 9 state/act
pairs and 3 signals on simulation under simple reinforcement learning. In this case,
the chance payoff is 1/9 ≈ 0.1111, and the maximal payoff—again, occurring at any
possible stable partition and correspondent receiver strategy—is 1/3 ≈ 0.3333. Af-
ter 106 plays per run, the expected payoff is 0.3332, on average (1000 runs). Almost
every (0.926) run achieves a near-perfect expected payoff greater than 0.3330, and
every run (1.000) achieves an expected payoff greater than 0.3300. Again, learning
is fast: the cumulative success rate is 0.3323 after 106 plays per run, on average,
and almost every run (0.990) achieves a cumulative success rate of at least 0.330.
Again, the unbiased partition, 〈3, 3, 3〉, is the most common of the 28 stable
partitions. About 1/6 of the time (0.160), the sender and receiver perfectly partition
nature for maximal information transfer, and more than 2/3 of the time (0.684),
the sender and receiver partition nature near-perfectly—that is, a 〈3, 3, 3〉 partition
or one of the six permutations of the 〈4, 3, 2〉 partition. Rarely (0.031), the sender
and receiver fail to evolve a clear partition of nature—usually, this is because the
receiver has learned early on to never choose some act. In this case, the sender
usually mixes the correspondent state over two signals. The urn for this state
(almost) never changes, since the receiver (almost) never chooses that action.28
Figure 5 shows the distribution of runs for the impoverished signalling game
with 9 state/act pairs and 3 signals under simple reinforcement. The fact that the
function from the combinatorial measure. This gives us a calculated p-value of 0.0017, implying
that we can reject the null hypothesis with high confidence.
28Of course, since there is no punishment, every conditional action for the sender and receiver has
some weight; however, in these cases, the weight for these acts is less than 1 in 2500.
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Figure 5. Partitioning 9 unbiased states with 3 signals. Compar-
ison of experimental results with combinatorial expectation and
average information transfer
combinatorial measure does not perfectly track the actual distribution of partitions
on simulation is even more pronounced here: the observed frequency of the 〈3, 3, 3〉
partition is twice that of the expected frequency based on the combinatorial ar-
gument. This suggests that these discrepancies cannot be accounted for by mere
noise. Again, the likelihood of more biased partitions drops off even faster than the
number of ways to obtain these partitions: the observed frequency of the 〈6, 2, 1〉
partition, for example, is 1/4 of the expected frequency.
As such, it appears that the impoverished signalling game tracks unbiased—or
close to unbiased—partitions significantly better than the combinatorial measure
over the possible ways of obtaining each distinct type of partition. When we intro-
duce some bias into nature, we see that the combinatorial measure alone cannot be
used to explain the observed frequencies.
4.2.2. Biased Nature. Let us consider, again, the impoverished signalling game with
10 state/act pairs and 2 signals. However, let us now suppose that nature is biased
so that the probability distribution over the set of states is given by
∆(S) =
[
1
2
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
1
18
]
for states s0 through s9, respectively. Again, the chance payoff is 1/10 = 0.10.
When signals are used optimally—i.e., a 〈1, 9〉 partition, corresponding to the biased
state and every other state—the maximal expected payoff is 5/9 ≈ 0.5556. On
simulation, under simple reinforcement, after 106 plays per run, the expected payoff
is 0.5502, on average (1000 runs). Many runs (0.8989) achieve an expected payoff
of at least 0.550 by 106 plays. As with the unbiased-nature simulations, learning is
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fast: the cumulative success rate is 0.5496 after 106 plays, on average (1000 runs),
and many runs (0.887) achieve a cumulative success greater than 0.550.
Most of the time (0.897) the players learn to coordinate upon a partition nature.
Most often (0.570), we see a 〈9, 1〉 or a 〈1, 9〉 partition (with approximately equal
frequency). Here, the sender partitions the biased state into one signal, and the
rest of the states into the other signal. About 1/4 of the time (0.281), the sender
pools a second state into the signal containing the biased state for an 〈8, 2〉 or
〈2, 8〉 partition (again, with approximately equal frequency). Sometimes (0.082),
the sender pools two extra states into the signal containing the biased state for a
〈3, 7〉 or 〈7, 3〉 partition. Rarely (0.008), the sender pools three extra states into the
signal containing the biased state for a 〈4, 6〉 or 〈6, 4〉 partition. On simulation, we
never see a 〈5, 5〉 partition.
However, in every case, when the sender pools an extra state into the signal that
contains the biased state, the receiver learns to never choose the action correspond-
ing to that signal. That is, the sender always partitions one action—the action
corresponding to the biased state—via the signal that contains the biased state in
its partition. Thus, when the partition is, e.g., 〈2, 8〉, the signal that pools two
states carries disjunctive information about those states, and is sent with (uncon-
ditional) probability 10/18; however, the receiver interprets the signal as carrying
complete information about the act—namely, the act corresponding to the biased
state.
More subtle pooling can occur when nature is biased in this way. Sometimes
(0.083), the receiver learns to ignore the signal, and only do the action corresponding
to the biased state. (For one signal, she puts full weight on the act corresponding
to the biased state; for the other signal, she puts weight between (0.95, 1.00) on the
same state, with weight between (0.00, 0.05) distributed over the remaining actions
for that signal.) Here the players receive an average payoff of 0.4999.
The rest of the time (0.020), we get a graded result between these two cases.
The sender puts full weight on the action corresponding to the biased state for one
signal, and she puts some weight between (0.05, 0.95) on the same act for the other
signal. This gives an average payoff of 0.5222.
We see similar behaviour when we examine the impoverished signalling game
with 9 state/act pairs and 3 signals. Suppose that nature is biased so that the
probability distribution over the set of states is given by
∆(S) =
[
1
3
1
3
1
21
1
21
1
21
1
21
1
21
1
21
1
21
]
for states s0 through s8, respectively. The chance payoff, again, is 1/9 ≈ 0.1111.
When signals are used optimally—i.e., a 〈1, 1, 7〉 partition—the maximal expected
payoff is 15/21 ≈ 0.7142. On simulation, under simple reinforcement, after 106
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plays per run, the expected payoff is 0.6970, on average (1000 runs), and many runs
(0.794) achieve an expected payoff of at least 0.71 by 106 plays. The cumulative
success rate is 0.6952 after 106 plays, on average (1000 runs), with about 3/4 (0.742)
of the runs achieving a cumulative success rate of at least 0.71.
As with the 10× 2 case with biased nature, qualitatively, three different things
happen. Most of the time (0.772), the sender and receiver optimally partition the
states/acts with the signals for a maximal possible payoff. Of these, the most com-
mon result (0.347) is that the sender partitions one biased state into one signal,
the other biased state into the other signal, and the remaining seven states into
the third signal—a 〈7, 1, 1〉 partition (or its permutations, with each permutation
occurring with approximately equal frequency), and the receiver responds accord-
ingly. Next most often (0.325), the sender pools an extra state with one of the
signals that contains one of the biased states for a 〈6, 2, 1〉 partition. The rest
of the time (0.194), we see all the remaining partitions, noting that the unbiased
〈3, 3, 3〉 partition occurs least frequently.29
The most important thing to note is that when the sender pools another state
(or states) into the signal containing one of the biased states, the receiver learns to
ignore the action associated with the extra state, and puts all weight for that signal
onto the act associated with the biased state; thus, as with the 10 × 2 case, even
though the signal may carry disjunctive information about the states, the receiver
interprets it as carrying full information about a single act.
Sometimes (0.034), the sender pools both of the biased actions into one signal,
and the receiver mixes over the appropriate actions, given that signal. The receiver
perfectly partitions the remaining seven states into the other two signals, and the
receiver mixes over the appropriate actions, conditional upon the signal received.
This strategy has an expected payoff of 9/21 ≈ 0.4286.
Again, the rest of the time, we get a graded result between these two cases.
Here the sender puts some weight on the same (biased) state over two signals, and
the receiver puts some weight on the same action (corresponding to that biased
state) from two signals. Thus, the sender mixes signals for one biased state and
perfectly partitions the other biased state. When the receiver puts much weight on
the same act for two different signals, she generally ignores all the other actions.
This strategy has an expected payoff of 2/3 = 0.6667. This happens under 1/5 of
the time (0.194).
29More specifically, this includes the 〈5, 3, 1〉 partition (occurring 0.073); the 〈4, 4, 1〉 partition
(occurring 0.019); the 〈5, 2, 2〉 partition (occurring 0.066); the 〈4, 3, 2〉 partition (occurring 0.030);
and, rarely, the 〈3, 3, 3〉 partition (occurring 0.005). Again, in each case, we see all permutations
occurring with approximately equal frequency.
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4.2.3. Different Dynamics. We might wonder whether there is something special
about simple reinforcement learning that leads to the results we have seen thus far.
However, in examining variations of the learning dynamic, we must be sensitive to
the parameters of this game. For example, under a dynamic like Win-Stay/Lose-
Shift, no set of strategies will be stable. Since there is a significant informational
bottleneck in the 10×2 impoverished signalling game, at a signalling system the best
the players can do is to lose half the time. Thus, they will continuously shift their
strategies.30 However, they may spend some time in one region of the distribution
space, depending upon how the parameters of the model are implemented.
Here, I examine a variation of the simple reinforcement learning model to include
punishment for miscoordination. However, the model is extremely sensitive to the
parameters. We have already seen, in the simple reinforcement learning model,
that the sender and receiver often co-evolve their strategies; however, the receiver
sometimes learns more quickly than the sender, and this results in the receiver
ignoring some (or, when nature is quite biased, most) of the signals that the sender
sends. Therefore, if punishment is too severe, then the receiver will quickly learn
to glom onto a particular action for one or the other signal. This results in a 〈1, 9〉
or 〈9, 1〉 partition on the receiver’s end. However, the sender has no opportunity to
finesse a partition to which the receiver will be responsive. If the receiver learns too
quickly—as happens with severe punishment—she never performs certain actions,
so the sender is continually punished, at equal rates for each of the signals, when
the states corresponding to those unused actions are chosen by nature. Thus, on
average, her strategy remains unchanged for those particular states.
I examine a 10 × 2 signalling game where nature is unbiased, and where the
dynamic includes a positive payoff [+2] for coordination, and a negative payoff,
or punishment, [−0.1] for miscoordination. The success rate is as before—0.10 at
chance, and 0.20 at a signalling system. Taking account of reward and punishment,
the expected payoff is 0.11 at chance and 0.32 at a signalling system. Though
the formula for calculating the maximum expected payoff at a signalling system
no longer applies straightforwardly, the results of Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 still hold.
I examine the communicative success rate since this measure is equivalent to the
impoverished signalling game previously discusses—0.10 at chance and 0.20 at a
signalling system. After 106 plays per run, the communicative success rate is 0.1997,
on average (1000 runs). Almost all runs (0.943) achieved a success rate greater than
0.1990. Learning is still fast.
30See the discussion of Win-Stay/Lose-Shift in Barrett and Zollman (2009); Huttegger and Zoll-
man (2011), and the related dynamic Win-Stay/Lose-Randomise in Barrett and Zollman (2009);
Barrett et al. (2017).
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When we introduce punishment into the impoverished signalling game, the sender
and receiver fail to evolve a clear partition of nature more often than without pun-
ishment (this occurs in 0.250 runs). This is because the receiver now learns more
quickly not to perform actions that often lead to failures. As was mentioned above,
when this happens, the sender is equally punished for sending m0 or m1 in the state
corresponding to the act which the receiver never chooses. Thus, over time, the
signals in the urn for this state remain unbiased, and the sender signals randomly
when this state is chosen.
Of the runs that evolve a clear partition, the unbiased 〈5, 5〉 partition is the most
common of the 9 stable partitions for this game: again, about one-third of the time
0.307, the sender and receiver perfectly partition nature for maximal information
transfer. Most of the time (0.738), the sender and receiver partition nature near-
perfectly—i.e., a 〈5, 5〉, 〈6, 4〉, or 〈4, 6〉 partition.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of runs for the impoverished signalling game
with 10 state/act pairs and 2 signals under simple reinforcement as compared with
the same parameters with punishment. Note again that the combinatorial measure
Figure 6. Partitioning 10 unbiased states with 2 signals. Com-
parison of impoverished signalling game with and without punish-
ment
does not perfectly track the actual distribution of partitions on simulation without
punishment. However, when punishment is included in the learning dynamic, the
distribution of partitions observed on simulation is somewhat more closely tracked
by the combinatorial measure—though the distribution still tends to favour more
informative partitions. This too is perhaps surprising, since the punishment is for
miscoordination on individual actions—the sender and receiver are not punished
for failing to evolve a maximally informative partition of nature.
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Furthermore, learning is extremely sensitive to the parameters chosen. For ex-
ample, when the sender receives both a reward and punishment [+2,−0.1], but the
receiver is not punished [+1, 0], the distribution is qualitatively similar to those
previously discussed, but the sender and receiver are more successful at evolving
a clear partition of nature, failing only at a rate of approximately 0.04. When re-
wards are asymmetric in the other direction ([+1, 0] for the sender, and [+2,−0.1]
for the receiver), they essentially always fail to evolve a clear partition (approxi-
mately 0.95). In these cases, the players still coordinate successfully for a success
rate close to 0.20 after 106 plays per run. However, the receiver learns very quickly
(with punishment) to simply ignore many of the actions—she puts all of her weight
on a single action for each of the signals. Thus, the sender never reinforces for the
states corresponding to those actions; rather than learning to partition nature, she
is learning to manipulate the (quickly fixed) dispositions of the receiver.31
This further serves to highlight the importance of the role asymmetries of the
sender and receiver, as is discussed in Brusse and Bruner (2017); LaCroix (2019a).
Note, that Brusse and Bruner (2017) suggest that signalling systems evolve more
readily when the sender learns more quickly than the receiver and that this re-
sult is quite robust—they highlight that Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008) show that
signalling conventions are possible when the mutation rate of the receiver popula-
tion exceeds that of the sender population under the replicator-mutator dynamic.
The results presented here are consistent with their analysis to the extent that they
interpret this as a situation in which the receiver (population) is relatively unrespon-
sive to the sender population. This is precisely what happens in the impoverished
signalling game when the receiver learns too quickly: the receiver becomes unre-
sponsive to the sender, forcing the sender to learn how to ‘manipulate’ the receiver
instead of learning a partition of nature.
5. Discussion
Barrett and LaCroix (2020) emphasise, as I have here, that a language which
partitions nature into equally probable sets allows for maximal information trans-
fer. We should undoubtedly expect agents who are rewarded for communicating
the most information per signal to evolve a communication system that is maxi-
mally informative—for example, if signals are costly. However, I have demonstrated
clearly that costly signalling is by no means a necessary condition for the evolution
of such an efficient, maximally-informative language. Indeed, in many cases, the
sender and receiver evolve a nearly unbiased partition of nature under simple re-
inforcement learning, where signalling is cost-free, and there is no punishment for
31For a discussion of sensory manipulation in the context of signalling games, see Barrett and
Skyrms (2017).
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miscoordination. Furthermore, when punishment is introduced for miscoordination,
the players learn more often a maximally informative signalling system. Again, this
is even though the cost of signalling is not a cost for being less informative.
Barrett and LaCroix (2020) use these results to explain how the structural prop-
erties of a language come to reflect the world in which the language evolved. This
shows how something like a principle of indifference (in a Bayesian sense) might arise
naturally in an evolutionary context. The key thing to note is that the naturalness
of a particular partition depends inherently upon the context under consideration.
I have shown here that nothing about the communicative success of a partition
alone recommends a symmetric partition; nonetheless, individuals are more likely
to choose partitions that maximise information transfer, given the communicative
capacities with which they are endowed.
Payoff alone drives the dynamics under reinforcement learning: upon receiving
a reward, the sender and receiver reinforce their behaviour, so rewards drive rein-
forcement. Despite this analytic fact, we have seen that under simulation there is
a natural tendency to move toward the most informative signalling system avail-
able. At first blush, this should be somewhat surprising, given that every signalling
system in the impoverished signalling game has equivalent communicative success.
A priori, there is no reason to think that one type of partition will be favoured
over another. In hindsight, however, we see that signalling systems are not in fact
equiprobable, when accounting for distinct partitions, and the most likely signalling
systems naturally come equipped with maximal information transfer. This point
generalises to the extent that both the binomial coefficient and the quantity of in-
formation are functions that increase monotonically toward the unbiased partition
(and decrease monotonically away from it).32
What I have shown in this paper is that agents learning to coordinate tend to
favour maximal information transfer in spite of the fact that nothing from an initial
analysis of the stability properties of the underlying signalling game suggests that
this should be the case. Further, I have explained why this might be so—namely, the
underlying structure of our model favours maximal information transfer in regard
to the simple combinatorial properties of how the agents might partition nature. I
showed that the structure of the game is such that there are more ways to achieve
maximal information transfer than not for any particular partition. Furthermore,
when nature is biased, the combinatorial argument alone cannot suffice to explain
the observed frequency of the various partitions under simulation. This suggests
that there is something over and above the combinatorial argument offered here that
is causing the results that we see. However, the analytic connection between the
32This follows straightforwardly from the formula for entropy on the one hand and the formula
for the binomial coefficient on the other.
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partitions in the impoverished signalling game and maximal information transfer
remains to be shown. This is an open question.
To the extent that the models presented accurately capture some real-world nat-
ural processes, we have seen that the evolutionary process is such that we can expect
individuals to communicate as efficiently as possible (at least under the contexts
which I have examined) and further that there is a natural tendency to achieve
maximal information transfer. That being said, the models presented here are,
of course, highly idealised and highly simplified—the actual world is significantly
more complex than the world which our sender and receiver inhabit. However, I
suggest that they are illuminating nonetheless, in the very least in a ‘how-possibly’
sense. Further examination is clearly warranted. On a methodological note, then,
this paper serves as an example to highlight the complementary roles of numerical
simulations and analytic results.
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Appendix A. Extended Proofs
Proposition 3.1: The maximal communicative success rate for
the impoverished signalling game, as defined in Definition 2.3, is
maxpi(σ, ρ) =
|M |
|S| .
Proof. The communicative success rate, as per Definition 2.1, is
given by
pi(σ, ρ) =
∑
s∈S
P (s)
∑
a∈A
u(s, a) ·
(∑
m∈M
σ(s)(m) · ρ(m)(a)
)
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Under the assumption that nature is unbiased, as per Definition 2.3,
it follows that this is equivalent to
pi(σ, ρ) =
1
|S|
[∑
a∈A
u(s, a) ·
(∑
m∈M
σ(s)(m) · ρ(m)(a)
)]
Under the assumption that the utility function is as it is given in
Definition 2.3, u(si, aj) = 0 whenever i 6= j. Therefore, this further
simplifies to
pi(σ, ρ) =
1
|S|
 |S|∑
i=1
|M |∑
j=1
σ(si)(mj) · ρ(mj)(ai)

Note that σ(si)(m) is equivalent to P(m|si), and similarly ρ(m)(ai)
is equivalent to P(ai|m). Thus, we can expand the summation
inside the brackets. For ease of exposition, I will represent this
expanded sum as a table of values, with each cell containing an
individual summand.

P(m0|s0)P(a0|m0) · · · P(m|M ||s0)P(a0|m|M |)
P(m0|s1)P(a1|m0) · · · P(m|M ||s1)P(a1|m|M |)
...
. . .
...
P(m0|s|S|)P(a|S||m0) · · · P(m|M ||s|S|)P(a|S||m|M |)

By Definition 3.1, a partition is a set of states such that P(m|s) =
1. Therefore, by the law of total probability, it follows that exactly
1 the signal-probabilities conditional on the state equals 1 for each
row of the summand written above, and the rest equal zero.
Thus, we write our sum more compactly as follows:
P(a0|m0) P(a0|m1) · · · P(a0|m|M |)
P(a1|m0) P(a1|m1) · · · P(a1|m|M |)
...
...
. . .
...
P(a|S||m0) P(a|S||m1) · · · P(a|S||m|M |)

I just noted that many of these cells will be equal to 0, since
they will be multiplied by 0. However, what is important to note
is that (1) This table has dimensions |S| × |M |, and (2) all of the
columns sum to 1, by the law of total probability. Therefore, our
entire sum reduces to |M | additions of 1.
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Therefore, we have
pi(σ, ρ) =
1
|S| [|M |]
Therefore, under the assumption that all states are equiprobable,
and the utility function is as in Definition 2.3, it follows that the
maximal communicative success rate for this signalling game is
maxpi(σ, ρ) =
|M |
|S| .

Corollary 3.1: In a signalling game, as defined in Definition 2.3,
a strategy wherein the sender does not take advantage of all of the
signals available to her has a lower communicative success rate than
a strategy which does take advantage of all the signals available to
her.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, we know that the maximal payoff avail-
able to the sender and receiver is given by |M ||S| . I note that if the
sender does not use a particular signal, then the receiver will pool
all her actions to the remaining |M | − 1 possible messages that she
will receive. If she did not, then her strategy would not be a best
response to the sender’s strategy, σ. It follows, by the same argu-
ment as in Proposition 4.1 that the maximum expected payoff for
a strategy of this sort will be
|M | − 1
|S| <
|M |
|S| .
Therefore, the sender and receiver cannot acheive maximal payoff
unless they take advantage of all the available messages. 
